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A More Sensible Approach to Regulating Independent 
Expenditures: Defending the Constitutionality of the 
FEC's New Express Advocacy Standard 
Michael D. Leffel 
INTRODUCTION 
Campaign finance reformers argue that the "unholy alliance of pri­
vate money and public elections" has created "a crisis of confidence in 
our elected officials. "1 The now-deceased campaign reform advocate 
Philip M. Stem summed up the role of money in campaigns this way: 
"[M]oney-power has replaced people-power as the driving force in 
American politics and the determinant of electoral victory. "2 
One form of "money-power" in elections that received a great 
deal of attention in the last election cycle was "independent expendi­
tures. "3 Independent expenditures are funds spent by interested individ­
uals or groups - usually in the form of television or radio advertise­
ments or mass mailings4 - to support or defeat a particular candidate, 
but are not coordinated in any way with the candidate or her campaign 
organization.5 The Federal Election Campaign A ct ("FECA" or "the 
1. Ellen S. Miller & Philip M. Stem, Democratically Financed Elections, in 
CHANGING AMERICA: BLUEPRINTS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 759 {Mark 
Green et al. eds., 1992). Even elected officials have expressed concern. For example, 
former Member of Congress Millicent Fenwick once remarked: "In my mind, there is 
no question that there is a connection between these [campaign] contributions and 
votes. I have sought votes and members have told me they received such-and-such an 
amount of money from one of these groups and they could not vote with me." MARK 
GREEN, WINNING BACK AMERICA 135 (1982) (quoting Rep. Millicent Fenwick (R­
NJ)). 
2. PHILIP M. STERN, STILL THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY 5 (1992). 
3. See, e.g., Philip Dine, Labor, Business Groups Battle, Try To Advance Their 
Agenda, ST. Lams POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 1996, at A20; Donald Lambro, Election 
Lesson Not Lost on GOP, WASH. TIMES, November 24, 1996, at Al; Michael 
Resendes, Campaign Reform Flounders, Partisan Gulf on Spending Widens, BOSTON 
GLOBE, November 24, 1996, at Al. 
4. In addition to making independent expenditures for television advertising or 
mass mailings, independent expenditures can be made to support paid political staff that 
work in a variety of capacities to organize support for the candidate. See 2 U.S.C. § 
431(17) (1994). 
5. The requirement that the independent expenditure not be coordinated means that 
the individual or group making the expenditure can have no contact with either the can­
didate or her campaign. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994) (defining "independent expendi­
ture"). If there is coordination, then the expenditure is treated as a direct contribution. 
686 
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Act")6 requires individuals or groups making such expenditures to reg­
ister with the Federal Election Committee ("FEC"), periodically to dis­
close in their reports to the FEC the expenditures they have made,7 and 
to identify themselves on the communication as the source of the elec­
toral advocacy. 8 The Act also prohibits corporations from making inde­
pendent expenditures from their general treasury accounts.9 Failure to 
comply with the FECA's requirements for independent expenditures 
may result in civil or criminal prosecution, including fines or 
imprisonment.10 
See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994). Political party committees, however, like the Demo­
cratic or Republican National Committees, are able to make some coordinated expendi­
tures that are capped at a higher rate based on the voting-age population of the state for 
Senate seats or House districts, thus exceeding the usual direct contribution limits 
placed on individuals and Political Action Committees ("PACs"). See 2 U.S.C. 44la(d) 
(1994). 
This Note only deals with legitimately uncoordinated independent expenditures. It 
probably comes as no surprise that some elected officials do illegally coordinate with 
groups making independent expenditures. See Eric Pianin, Ethics Panel Turns Eye To 
Gramm, WASH. PosT. Sept. 8, 1995, at A19 (discussing Senator Packwood's diary en­
try indicating that Packwood's top aide, Elaine Franklin, "breached a law prohibiting 
candidates from soliciting organizations to make independept expenditures on their be­
half"); David Sarasohn, Some Passages in Diary Look Familiar, PORTLAND OREGO­
NIAN. Sept. 21, 1995, at CS (discussing fact that Packwood's diary indicates he had di­
rect conversations regarding independent expenditures, and in some cases gave prior 
approval to advertisements, by the National Rifle Association and the Auto Dealers 
Association). 
6. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, as 
amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 
88 Stat. 1263. 
7. An individual or group that makes independent expenditures in excess of $1000 
per year falls under the FECA's definition of a "political committee" and thus is re­
quired to report and disclose such expenditures. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (1994) (de­
fining "political committee"); 2 U.S.C. § 432 (1994) (listing organizational require­
ments for committees); 2 U.S.C. § 433 (1994) (requiring committees to register with the 
FEC); 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1994) (requiring committees to report expenditures to the FEC). 
8. See 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3) (1994); Notice of Authorization on Brochure, 1 Fed. 
Election Camp. Fin. (CCH) 'lI 5554 at 10,676, 10,677 (Oct. 3, 1980). 
9. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994). 
10. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)( l)(A) (1994) (failure of a "political committee" to re­
port expenditures can result in a fine not to exceed the greater of $25,000 or 300% of 
any expenditure involved in such violation, or one year in jail, or both). The Federal 
Election Commission, a bipartisan body created by the FECA, may also seek civil pen­
alties for violations of the FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(6) (1994). Many penalties are 
collected by the FEC at the administrative level and can be substantial. See August 
Doledrums, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1993, at A22 (FEC ordered Senator Robert Dole to 
pay $100,000 in penalties as part of settlement); Robertson Must Repay Money From 
'88 Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at A9 (FEC ordered Robertson to pay almost 
$22,000 in civil penalties). However, the FEC's penalty requests are sometimes reduced 
or eliminated by courts. See FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 778 F. Supp. 62, 66 
(D.D.C. 1991) (FEC's requested $415,744.72 civil penalty reduced, defendant only re-
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During the 1996 election season; labor, environmental, and right­
wing organizations combined to spend well over forty-six million dol­
lars on "educating" voters about various issues.1 1 A major question 
confrontiilg courts now is whether these "educational" spots are actu­
ally independent expenditures that trigger the FECA's reporting and dis­
closure requirements, or whether they purely advocate a particular posi­
tion on an issue that, under the First Amendment, cannot be regulated.12 
The problem for reformers who want to limit the impact of pur­
portedly educational spending like that by groups such as the AFL-CIO 
and the Christian Coalition is that, according to the Supreme Court, reg­
ulating money in political elections is akin to regulating free speech be­
cause money is so essential in modern times in enabling an individual 
or group to disseminate its political message.13 Political speech is a cru-
quired to pay for FEC enforcement, investigation, and legal costs); FEC v. Ted Haley 
Cong. Comm., 654 F. Supp. 1 120, 1 127 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (refusing FEC penalty re­
quest because defendant promptly corrected violation). 
1 1. See George Church, The Balance of Power: The Republicans Hold the House, 
but Speaker Gingrich Will Need To Find Common Ground with Gephardt's Democrats, 
TIME, Nov. 18, 1996, at 53, 55 (noting that the AFL-CIO's $35 million in spending on 
radio and television "were instrumental in defeating • . •  several G.O.P. freshmen" 
and that the Christian Coalition played a similar role on the right by distributing 45 mil­
lion "voter guides" that consistently hammered Democrats on key issues like abortion); 
John H. Cushman Jr., Environmentalists Ante Up To Sway a Number of Races: Spend­
ing Millions to Promote Their Agendas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A13 (indicating 
that the Sierra Club spent close to $7.5 million in the two-year election cycle, that this 
"mimics closely" the approach taken by the Christian Coalition and the AFL-CIO, and 
that the plan appears to have had some effect even before the election took place: Con­
gress voted overwhelmingly this summer for a few bills favored by environmental 
groups"). 
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 ,  80 (1976) 
(per curiam) (holding that the FEC cannot regulate strict issue advocacy); Richard L. 
Berke, Lawsuit Says Christian Coalition Gave Illegal Help to Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 31, 1996, at Al (noting that the FEC filed suit in the federal district court in the 
District of Columbia alleging that the Christian Coalition, "the nation's largest group of 
religious conservatives[,] had acted illegally to promote several Republican 
candidates"). 
13. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. The Court stopped short of saying that "money is 
speech." See 424 U.S. at 22; Cass Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Conse­
quences, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1394 (1994). The Court's reasoning, however, can 
be explained most simply by Justice White's reference to the maxim that "money 
talks." See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see also OWEN M. F1ss. THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 14-15 (1996) (arguing 
that money is not speech, but that expenditures "can still make claim to the First 
Amendment"); James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing 
Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. R.Ev. 189, 252 
(1990). But see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 
YALE LJ. 1001 ( 1976) (suggesting that money is not the equivalent of speech). In 
Buckley, the Court noted "[t]he Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate 
in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." 424 U.S. at 14. The 
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cial means of checking government abuses, realizing individual self­
fulfillment, and creating a safety valve for society to discuss freely 
grievances and proposed remedies - a means that is therefore jealously 
guarded under the First Amendment.14 The Supreme Court therefore 
treats the money spent as equivalent to speaking out on an issue and ap­
plies a stricter level of scrutiny to the regulation of such spending. 15 
Thus, reformers must struggle to control the insidious role of money in 
federal elections without discouraging the political speech that most 
commentators contend "form[s] the core of the free speech principle."16 
In order to protect free speech and association rights, the Supreme 
Court in Buckley v. Valeo11 adopted an "express advocacy" standard, 
which provides that communication can be regulated as an independent 
expenditure only if it is "communication[] that in express terms advo­
cate[s] the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for fed­
eral office."18 The Court indicated in a footnote that this defrnition 
would limit the Act to communication containing words such as "vote 
for" or "defeat."19 The Court determined that this narrower definition 
would be clear enough to allow the FEC to regulate speech that ex-
Court reasoned that the future course of the country depends on the ability of the citi­
zenry to make informed decisions with regard to candidates for elective office. This fact 
gives the First Amendment its " 'fullest and most urgent application precisely to the 
conduct of campaigns for political office.' " 424 U.S. at 15 (quoting Monitor Patriot 
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
14. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the marketplace of ideas); Vmcent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment The­
ory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 521; Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 
130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593 (1982) (emphasizing the value of self-realization); Harry 
H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE Lj. 1105 (1979). 
15. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40-44, 64 (per curiam). 
16. CASS R SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 
132 (1993); see also 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITU­
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.50, at 278 (1986) (citing Buckley); 
cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
18. 424 U.S. at 44 (emphasis added). The original definition of "independent ex­
penditures" in the 1974 amended version of the FECA was any uncoordinated expendi­
ture made "relative to a clearly identified candidate." 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(l )  (Supp. V 
1975) (repealed 1976). Current FEC regulations have incorporated the Buckley Court's 
express advocacy standard into the definition of "independent expenditures," defming 
the term as any expenditure 
by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, 
or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made 
in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any author­
ized committee or agent of such candidate. 
2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994) (emphasis added). 
19. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
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pressly advocates for or against an identified candidate in an election 
while not chilling political speech aimed at advocating issues - often 
called "issue advocacy. "2 0  
Under the Buckley ruling, Congress is forbidden to cap the amount 
of money an individual or group may spend on independent expendi­
tures.21 Buckley, however, allows the FECA's caps on the amount of di­
rect contributions - money or in-kind services given by an individual 
or group to a candidate that can be used in whatever way the candidate 
chooses.22 Because of the caps on direct contributions, individuals and 
groups seeking to influence elections have dramatically increased the 
amount of money spent on independent expenditures since Buckley.23 
20. See 424 U.S. at 81-82. 
21. See 424 U.S. at 51. 
22. See 424 U.S. at 26-27; see also 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (1994) (defining direct 
contributions). The amended FECA limits individuals to maximum contributions of 
$1000 to any single candidate per election, see 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(A) (1994), with 
an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor. See 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)(3) 
(1994). Registered political committees are limited to $5000 contributions to any single 
candidate per election. See 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)(2)(A) (1994). Other groups, not regis­
tered as political committees, are limited to contributions of $1000 per candidate per 
election. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l )(A) (1994). 
23. In 1978, two years after Buckley, independent expenditures totalled $310,000. 
In 1986, $10.2 million was spent on independent expenditures during a nonpresidential 
election year and $23.4 million was spent in this manner in the presidential election 
year of 1984. See Candice J. Nelson, Loose Cannons: Independent Expenditures, in 
MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY: REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE 47, 48-49 (Margaret Latus Nugent & John R. Johannes, eds., 1990) (citing 
FEC Press Release, Oct 9, 1980; 1979-86: FEC Press Release, Mar. 31, 1988 (corrected 
release); 1988: FEC Post-general Election Reports (preliminary figures)). Reported in­
dependent expenditures fell to $10.6 million in 1991-1992, see Federal Election Com­
mission, 1992 PAC Activity Increases 7 (Jan. 1994) (press release), and to $5.1 million 
in 1993-1994. See Federal Election Commission, 1994 PAC Activity Shows Little 
Growth over 1992 Level 7 (Nov. 1995) (press release). Why the drop in independent 
expenditures? Many campaign finance reform commentators note the intense rise in 
"strict issue advocacy" pieces (as interpreted by the courts) which do not need to be re­
ported. See Eliza Newlin Camey, Air Strikes, NATL. J., June 15, 1996, at 1313 (discuss­
ing the "explosion of issue advocacy campaigns"). 
The role of independent expenditures has also been spurred on by today's high­
dollar, television-driven congressional races. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHBRE & 
SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: How PoLmCAL ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK 
AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE 1-16 (1995); LARRY J. SABATO, THE RISE OF PO· 
LmCAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING ELECTIONS 117 (1981) (noting 
that television is the predominant medium for informing voters). Serious candidates in a 
contested House race can expect to spend one million dollars on their campaigns and 
Senate candidates often spend in excess of ten million dollars. See Beth Donovan, Con­
stitutional Issues Frame Congressional Options, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 431, 434 
(1993). Most candidates have no choice but to rely on large-dollar contributions from 
individuals and PACs that seek to influence politicians and elections. FECA's caps on 
direct contributions have made it somewhat more difficult for candidates to raise money 
since they must have a larger number of contributors rather than relying on a few ex-
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At the same time, some courts have interpreted the "express advo­
cacy" standard so narrowly as to allow individuals and groups essen­
tially to evade even the FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements.24 
In other words, not only do individuals and groups face no caps on in­
dependent expenditures, but by merely changing the wording of an ad­
vertisement that otherwise would be considered express advocacy, they 
are permitted by some courts to make massive expenditures without 
even reporting or disclosing such spending.25 
The First Circuit has decided that the danger of chilling important 
political speech requires a very narrow interpretation of the express ad­
vocacy standard. Seizing on the language of the Buckley footnote,26 the 
First Circuit adopted a strict, literal interpretation of the express advo­
cacy standard, which looks only to the four comers of the communica­
tion to see if the "magic words," such as "vote for" or "vote against," 
were used.27 If these magic words are not included, the communication 
does not constitute express advocacy and thus no reporting and disclo­
sure can be required.28 
tremely wealthy donors. See LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LIT-
11..B SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN PoLmCS 54, 333 
(1996). As a result, some candidates have essentially begun to rely on the independent 
expenditures by others to get out the candidate's message or attack her opponent. See 
Richard Stengel & Eric Pooley, Masters of the Message: Inside the High-Tech Machine 
that Set Clinton & Dole Polls Apart, TIME, Nov. 18, 1996, at 76, 82 (discussing how 
President Clinton's campaign relied on "soft money" from the Democratic Party "[t]o 
finance a massive TV buy" for particular "issue advocacy"); David E. Rosenbaum, In 
Minnesota Race, Negative Ads Outnumber Lakes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A13. 
24. See, e.g., Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1991); see also infra note 84 
(discussing other cases). 
25. See infra section I.B.1. In addition to making independent expenditures or di­
rect contributions to a particular candidate, individuals and organizations can also assist 
candidates indirectly through contributions to state and national political parties for 
"party-building" activities which include general party mailings or general thematic ad­
vertising that is not specific to a particular candidate. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l )(B) 
(1994) (placing a $20,000 cap on individual donations to national parties in a given 
year); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(B) (1994) (limiting PACs to $15,000 in contributions to 
national parties in a given year). In reality, this party-building money allows the state 
and national parties to offset expenditures that individual candidates would otherwise 
have to incur, such as get-out-the-vote efforts, general thematic mailings, telephone 
calls, and field staff. See STERN, supra note 2, at 165. 
26. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
27. See Faucher, 928 F.2d at 471-72; see also infra section I.B.1 (discussing the 
magic words approach). The Ninth Circuit coined the phrase "magic words" in describ­
ing a strict interpretation of the express advocacy standard. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 
F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987). 
28. See 928 F.2d at 471-72. 
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The FEC recently adopted a more context-based approach29 that 
codifies an earlier Ninth Circuit decision allowing the FEC to regulate a 
broader spectrum of campaign-related speech.3 0 The FEC and the Ninth 
Circuit look to the communication as a whole and consider its timing 
and other "external factors that contribute to a complete understanding 
of [the] speech" to determine whether the communication is so clearly 
unambiguous that reasonable people could not differ as to its meaning, 
that is, whether the communication advocates for or against a clearly 
identified candidate.31 This approach, the FEC and the Ninth Circuit 
contend, avoids the rigidity of the "magic words" standard and there­
fore potentially covers a broader and more appropriate range of speech. 
To appreciate the difference in these two approaches, consider two 
hypothetical examples of independent expenditure advertising seen dur­
ing a given campaign season. In the first example, the National Rifle 
Association32 runs an advertisement on November 2, three days before 
the general election. The television screen opens with a large caption 
"Don't let Bill do it to us again!" against a screen-size picture of Presi­
dent Clinton. The advertisement makes several comments about the 
President's campaign tactics and ends with a rousing message: "We 
have a right to own guns to protect ourselves. We have an opportunity 
three days from now to stop Bill Clinton from taking them away from 
us." The second hypothetical advertisement is exactly the same, but 
ends instead with the message, "Vote Against Bill Clinton." 
Both advertisements would be covered by the new FEC regulations 
because, based on their context, they unambiguously advocate the de­
feat of a clearly identified candidate. However, because the first adver­
tisement does not contain any of the magic words encouraging a voter 
to "vote against" President Clinton, the First Circuit would rule that 
this advertisement fails to clearly cross the threshold that divides issue 
29. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (1996); see also infra section I.B.2 (discussing the 
context-sensitive approach). Congress has provided the FEC with original jurisdiction 
over civil enforcement ofFECA, see 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(l) (1994), and the power to in­
itiate enforcement of the FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(6) (1994). The FEC is subject 
to judicial review; however, courts give the FEC great deference because Congress gave 
the FEC authority to enforce the FECA's provisions. See FEC v. Democratic Senatorial 
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981); Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 164 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986). Naturally, FEC decisions must be in accord with relevant court holdings. 
See Orloski, 195 F.2d at 166-67. 
30. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857. 
31. See 807 F.2d at 864. 
32. The National Rifle Association spent $720,000 in the 1994 congressional 
races, which brought the Republican party control of both houses of Congress for the 
first time since 1946. See John J. Fialka, NRA Support for House GOP Freshmen Pays 
Off, But Lawmakers Worry About Reformer Image, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1995, at A20. 
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advocacy (here, the right to own guns) from express advocacy (here, 
advocating the defeat of candidate Clinton).33 Thus, the First Circuit 
would hold that it falls beyond the reach of the FEC's authority to regu­
late elections. 
This Note contends that there is no justifiable distinction between 
advertisements like the two examples above: both should be construed 
as independent expenditures that can be regulated through reporting and 
disclosure requirements by the FEC. This Note therefore argues that the 
contextual approach of the new FEC regulations fully complies with 
Buckley's definition of express advocacy. The contextual approach ade­
quately protects the First Amendment rights of the parties involved 
while allowing the government to meet its compelling interests in fully 
informing the electorate and rooting out and deterring ftbuse in the elec­
toral process. 
In order to demonstrate the constitutionality of the new FEC regu­
lations, it is important to have a clear understanding of the rationale for 
the express advocacy standard. To this end, Part I describes the Su­
preme Court's development of the standard in Buckley v. Valeo and its 
progeny. It then details the resulting split between the federal circuits 
regarding the modem definition of "express advocacy" and the consti­
tutionality of the FEC's new regulations. Part II argues that the new 
regulations comply with Buckley and its progeny by balancing the First 
Amendment rights of individuals and groups against the compelling 
governmental interest in regulating independent expenditures and corpq­
rate contributions in federal elections. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPRESS ADVOCACY STANDARD 
In 1973, in the wake of the Watergate scandal and in response to 
the actual and perceived corrupting influence of money in eie·ctions, 
Congress passed its most comprehensive attempt to regulate the role of 
money in federal elections by amending the FECA.34 In addition to cap­
ping direct contributions35 and independent expenditures,36 the amend­
ments required candidates, individuals, and groups to disclose both di-
33. See Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1991). 
34. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 
88 Stat 1263; see also Daniel M. Gillen, Buckley v. Valeo: Federal Election Campaign 
Reform at the Expense of First Amendment Rights, 4 Omo N.U. L. REv. 77 (1977) (de­
tailing the history and legislative intent behind FECA). 
35. See supra note 22. 
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976). 
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rect contributions3 7  and independent expenditures to the FEC. For 
independent expenditures, individuals or groups making such expendi­
tures must register with the FEC and periodically disclose in their re­
ports to the FEC the expenditures they have made.3 8 
The Supreme Court in Buckley considered the constitutionality of 
these provisions. The Court first established that money spent in cam­
paigns is virtually equivalent to speech and, therefore, the regulation of 
money in campaigns was equated with regulating speech.3 9 The Court 
also determined that the FECA regulated First Amendment associational 
rights through its requirements that political associations register and re­
port their independent expenditures.40 Such reporting requirements 
might deter some individuals or groups from participating in an associa­
tion if they knew. their support would be disclosed to the public. Thus, 
because the FECA regulated a fundamental right,41 the Court required 
the governmental to show that the restrictions were narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling governmental interest. 4 2  
After upholding the cap o n  direct contributions43 - finding that it 
furthered a compelling governmental interest in deterring the potential 
for contributors "to purchase political favors from candidates, resulting 
in the corruption of the political process"44  - the Court turned its at­
tention to the FECA's regulation of independent expenditures. The 
37. The reporting and disclosing requirements for direct contributions require a 
candidate to periodically report the amount of money spent by the campaign and on 
what that money was spent See 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(f), 434(a), 438(a)(4) (1994). In addi­
tion, the campaign must report the name and occupation of any contributor who contrib­
utes in excess of $200 in aggregate to the campaign. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (1994). 
38. See supra note 7. 
39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
40. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam); see also LAURENCE 
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-31, at 1151-52 (2d ed. 1988) (de­
tailing the associational concerns accompanying reporting requirements). 
41. The Court noted that "[t]he restrictions, while neutral as to the ideas ex­
pressed, limit political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First 
Amendment freedoms.' " 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 
(1968)). 
42. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40-44, 64; see also TRIBE, supra note 40, § 12-2, at 
791 (defining strict scrutiny review as a balancing test between a compelling govern­
mental interest and the free speech interests, but weighted in favor of free speech to re­
flect its constitutional importance). In order for a statute to survive strict scrutiny re­
view, the Court must find (1) that the act addresses a compelling governmental interest 
and (2) that the restrictions abridge that fundamental right only to a reasonably minimal 
degree as is essential to advancing that governmental interest. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
40-44, 64; see also TRIBE, supra note 40, § 12-2, at 791. 
43. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. 
44. Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, Stalking the Elusive Express Advocacy Stan­
dard, 10 J.L. & PoL. 51, 59 (1993) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27). 
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Court expressed concern that the independent expenditure provisions, as 
drafted, threatened to improperly infringe on - or chill - the exercise 
of First Amendment free speech rights.45 If an individual feared she 
would receive a criminal fine46 for speaking her mind and not reporting 
the expenditure to the FEC, the Court reasoned, she might refrain from 
exercising the very political speech that forms the core of the First 
Amendment.47 The Court therefore restricted the reach of the indepen­
dent expenditure provisions to instances of "express advocacy."48 
This Part describes the Court's development of the express advo­
cacy standard and how lower courts have interpreted it as they attempt 
to strike a balance between First Amendment rights and the compelling 
government interest at stake. Section I.A describes the Court's estab­
lishment of the express advocacy standard and discusses the Court's 
narrow construction of the PECA based on the vagueness of the origi­
nal language of the Act. Section I.B presents and analyzes the different 
approaches taken by the federal appellate courts in applying the express 
advocacy standard - the standard of the new FEC regulations - and 
the way the new standard has been treated by the one lower federal 
court that has heard a case based on the new FEC regulations. 
A. The Establishment of the Express Advocacy Standard 
The Buckley Court's establishment of the express advocacy stan­
dard was a response to what the Court felt was the vagueness of the 
Act's independent expenditure provisions. This section describes the 
Buckley Court's concern over the amended FECA's language regulating 
independent expenditures and explains how the Court narrowed the ap­
plication of these regulations. It also describes the Buckley Court's ap­
plication of strict scrutiny review to these provisions and discusses how 
the Court elaborated on the express advocacy standard in FEC v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life. 49 
1. The Vagueness Problem 
Although the Court had upheld the FECA's caps on direct contri­
butions, it was particularly concerned by the FECA's language regulat­
ing independent expenditures because it applied anytime an individual 
or corporation spent money "relative to a clearly identified candidate," 
45. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41. 
46. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) (1994). 
47. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 n.48. 
48. See 424 U.S. at 44, 81-82. 
49. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
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that was not coordinated with any campaign. 50 The Court believed that 
such a definition was excessively vague; that is, the definition did not 
give sufficiently clear warning of the proscribed conduct. 51 A statute 
that is excessively vague violates due process for three principle rea­
sons. First, vague laws risk "trap[ping] the innocent by not providing 
fair warning. " 52 Second, they "foster 'arbitrary and discriminatory ap­
plication' " of the law. 53 Finally, they have a chilling effect on a funda­
mental right, "inducing 'citizens to " 'steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone' . . .  than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly 
marked." ' " 54 
In order to salvage the constitutionality of the Act, 55 the Court in­
terpreted the language regarding independent expenditures to apply only 
50. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-42, 80-81. The original disclosure provisions for 
independent expenditures covered any expenditures made "for the purpose of • • .  influ­
encing" the nomination or election of candidates to federal office. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(t) 
(Supp. V 1975) (amended 1980) (defining expenditure); 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (Supp. V 
1975) (amended 1980) (requiring reporting to the FEC). The original provision placing 
a cap on independent expenditures contained similar language. At the time of Buckley, 
18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(l) prohibited any person from making "any expenditure . . .  relative 
to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other 
expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the election or defeat of 
such candidate, exceeds $1,000." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 608(e)( l )  (Supp. IV 1974)). The Court limited the regulations' definition of expendi­
tures spent "relative to a clearly identified candidate" to communications that "ex­
pressly advocate" for or against a clearly identified candidate. See 424 U.S. at 44. The 
FECA has now encompassed the Court's approach by defining an independent expendi­
ture as "an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994). 
51. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41-42, 80-81. In addition to being considered under 
the vagueness doctrine, the independent expenditure provisions could be challenged as 
overbroad. Both doctrines attempt to prevent the chilling of otherwise protected speech. 
See International Union of Police Assns. Local 189 v. Barrett, 524 F. Supp. 760, 765 
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (overbreadth and vagueness are two separate concepts that often go 
hand in hand); ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 16, § 16.9 at 846; cf. Note, The Void for 
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 67, 110-113 (1960) 
(claiming that the voi4 for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are indistinguishable). 
Therefore, many of the same reasons that this Note submits to defend the new regula­
tions from attack on vagueness grounds also apply to the overbreadth issue. 
52. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
104, 108-09 (1972)). 
53. 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-
09 (1972)). 
54. 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 
(1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)))). 
55. See 424 U.S. at 44; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (discussing the Court's pref­
erence for finding a constitutionally acceptable construction of a statute over an inter­
pretation that would make the statute unconstitutional). 
December 1996] Note - Independent Expenditures 697 
when the message clearly identified a specific candidate and expressly 
advocated for or against that candidate.56 The Court added in a footnote 
that "[t]his construction would restrict the application of [the Act] to 
communications containing express words of advocacy of election or 
defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 
'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject.' "57 The Court de­
termined that this more narrow definition would be clear enough to al­
low the FEC to regulate speech which expressly advocates for or 
against an identified candidate in an election while preventing the chil­
ling of political speech aimed at advocating issues.58 
The Court's stated intention in adopting the express advocacy stan­
dard was to limit the FECA's application to only those independent ex­
penditures which "unambiguously related to the campaign of a particu­
lar federal candidate."59 This approach respected "issue advocacy,'' 
which the First Amendment protects.60 
2. Applying Strict Scrutiny 
The Buckley Court applied strict scrutiny because the PECA regu­
lates fundamental rights, in this case both the right to free speech and 
the right to free association.61 This standard of review requires the gov­
ernment to show a compelling interest for the measure and that the 
measure is narrowly tailored to meet this compelling interest.62 
Having narrowed the definition of independent expenditure to pro­
tect issue advocacy and to satisfy the vagueness doctrine, 63 the Court 
considered whether the government had a compelling interest in regu­
lating independent expenditures. The Court first determined that the 
government lacked a compelling interest to impose a ceiling on inde­
pendent expenditures that limited the amount of money any one person 
or group may independently spend "relative to a particular candi­
date. "64 While the Court determined that the government did have an 
interest in imposing a ceiling on large direct campaign contributions 
56. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41-44, 80. 
57. 424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (emphasis added). 
58. See 424 U.S. at 82. 
59. 424 U.S. at 80. 
60. See 424 U.S. at 79. 
61. See 424 U.S. at 14-23; see also supra notes 13, 40-42 and accompanying text. 
62. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra section l.A.1. 
64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27, 46-48 (evaluating 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(l) (Supp. IV 
1974)). It should be noted that when a candidate (or her campaign committee) coordi­
nates or controls the otherwise independent expenditure, it is treated by the FEC as a 
contribution. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47. 
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that could lead to political corruption through the purchase of political 
favors, it stated that "independent advocacy . . .  [did] not presently ap­
pear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to 
those identified with large campaign contributions. "65 The Court felt the 
candidate's lack of control over any aspect of an independent expendi­
ture undermined its value, and therefore posed little threat of a quid pro 
quo between the candidate and the individual or group doing the 
spending. 66 
Nonetheless, the Court then recognized three valid compelling 
governmental interests behind the FECA's reporting and disclosure re­
quirements and therefore upheld them as constitutional. 67 First, inform­
ing the electorate about the source of political campaign money aids 
voters in evaluating candidates. 68 Providing information about candi­
dates' financial supporters and opponents allows voters to "place each 
candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than" they could if 
they were merely relying on party affiliation or the campaign advertise­
ments paid for directly by a candidate. 69 Second, by exposing indepen­
dent expenditures to public scrutiny, disclosure and reporting aids in de­
terring corruption and avoiding the appearance of corruption. 7 0  Third, 
65. 424 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added). Since Buckley, the role of independent ex­
penditures in elections has vastly changed. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; 
State ex rel. WMC Issues Mobilization Council, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
No. 96-3133-W, at 10 (Wis. Ct App. Nov. 8, 1996) (opinion supplementing order of 
Nov. 1, 1996) {upholding a temporary injunction of unreported independent expendi­
tures Ul).der a state law similar to the FECA and noting that "[t]he role of advertising in 
political campaigns has changed dramatically in the twenty years since Buckley"). 
66. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47. 
67. See 424 U.S. at 64-68, 80-81. Some have criticized the majority opinion for 
holding that the reporting requirements survived strict scrutiny without ever directly 
stating in the text that the Court reached the question of whether the disclosure and re­
porting requirements were narrowly tailored. See 424 U.S. at 236-41 (Burger, CJ., dis­
senting); see also Gillen, supra note 34, at 80, 86-89 (criticizing the Court's lack of a 
narrowness scrutiny of the infringement of associational rights). 
It should also be noted that, despite the compelling governmental interests underly­
ing the FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements, the Court indicated that the FEC 
should not require disclosure if it would result in threats and harassment of disclosed 
contributors. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74. 
68. See 424 U.S. at 66-67. 
69. 424 U.S. at 67. 
70. See 424 U.S. at 67. As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote: "Publicity is justly com­
mended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants." LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (Frederick A. 
Stokes Co. 1914), quoted in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. The Buckley Court agreed and 
noted that an " 'informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon mis­
government' " 424 U.S. at 67 n.79 (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233, 250 (1936)); see also David K. Neidert, Comment, Campaign Reform: Fifteen 
Years After Buckley v. Valeo, 17 J. CoNTEMP. L. 289, 298-300 (1991) (indicating the 
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the reporting and disclosure requirements aid the government in gather­
ing information to detect violations of the contribution limits.71 
3. MCFL: Elaboration of the Standard 
In 1986, ten years after Buckley, the Court reiterated its express 
advocacy standard in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life12 and indi­
cated that it would look to the whole communication to determine if it 
met the definition of express advocacy - rather than simply consider­
ing whether or not the communication contained a direct message such 
as "Vote for Smith. "73 The mere fact that the communication in ques­
tion was "less direct . . .  d[id] not change its essential nature" as a 
communication meeting the definition of express advocacy. 74 
In MCFL, a nonprofit corporation had compiled a "pro-life" vot­
ing record sheet for the state and federal candidates in Massachusetts' 
primary election and published this record in a "Special Edition" of the 
organization's newsletter, which was distributed to the organization's 
membership as well as to the general public. 75 The "score sheet" identi­
fied candidates as either agreeing or disagreeing with the organization's 
pro-life views and included photographs of certain pro-life candidates, 
"admonish[ing] that '[n]o pro-life candidate can win in November 
without your vote in September.' "76 On the back page of the newslet­
ter, in large bold-faced letters, was the phrase "VOTE PRO-LIFE."77 
importance of disclosure requirements to inform the public and to enforce federal elec­
tion laws). But cf. Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (holding 
unconstitutional an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of campaign literature 
that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing 
the literature). 
71. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68; see also Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 
1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1990). 
72. 479 U.S. 238 (1986) [hereinafter MCFL]. 
73. See 419 U.S. at 249. 
74. 479 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added). The Court also held that the communication 
reached beyond the corporation's "restricted class," which is prohibited by § 44lb. See 
479 U.S. at 250. A corporation may use general, i.e. unsegregated, funds to communi­
cate a message containing express advocacy if it only goes to the corporation's re­
stricted class, see 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (1994), which includes "(1) communication by 
the corporation to its stockholders, executive and administrative personnel, and their 
families; (2) voter registration by the corporation of these individuals and their families; 
and (3) solicitation for voluntary contributions, to the corporation's separate, segregated 
fund (or PAC)." Hayward, supra note 44, at 64 n.100 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 44lb(b)(2) 
(1988)). 
75. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 243-44. 
76. 479 ·u.s. at 243. 
77. 479 U.S. at 243. 
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The publication also included a disclaimer: "This special election edi­
tion does not represent an endorsement of any particular candidate. "78 
Despite the disclaimer, the Court emphasized that the publication 
urged voters to vote for pro-life candidates and identified specific pro­
life candidates with photographs.79 The fact that the publication's exhor­
tation was "less direct than 'Vote for Smith' [did] not change its essen­
tial nature. "80 The publication "provide[d] in effect an explicit direc­
tive: vote for these (named) candidates."81 Thus the publication went 
"beyond issue discussion to express electoral advocacy. "82 
B. The Modern Conflict Over Express Advocacy 
Despite Buckley's exhaustive 294-page treatment of the issues sur­
rounding the FECA, the Court spent relatively little time discussing the 
express advocacy standard. The Court's decision in MCFL also appears 
to have done little to define more c�early what the Court meant by "ex­
press advocacy." Perhaps as a result, the Courts of Appeals and the 
FEC have differed over application of the phrase. Section l.B.1 dis­
cusses the strict interpretation of the express advocacy which looks only 
for the magic words or their synonyms.83 Section I.B.2 explains the new 
FEC regulations' context-sensitive approach, which essentially codifies 
the approach applied by the Ninth Circuit.84 Finally, section I.B.3 exam-
78. 479 U.S. at 243. 
79. See 479 U.S. at 249. 
80. 479 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added). 
81. 479 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added). 
82. 479 U.S. at 249. 
83. See Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., FEC v. 
Keefer, 502 U.S. 820 (1991). 
84. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 
(1987). Other circuits have heard cases that deal with interpreting the express advocacy 
standard, but it is unclear whether these courts look only for the magic words, or look 
more broadly to the context to find an unambiguous statement of advocacy. See, e.g., 
FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), 
revd. on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996); FEC v. Central Long Island Tax Re­
form Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 50-53 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter CLATRIM] 
(holding an organization's mailer, containing voting records of a member of Congress 
and reading "never forget that since you are paying the tax bills, you are the boss. And 
don't ever let your Representative forget it!" did not constitute express advocacy); FEC 
v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 958 (W.D. Va. 1995) (holding that 
Buckley created a bright-line rule); FEC v. American Fed. of State, County & Mun. Em­
ployees, 471 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding a poster depicting President Gerald 
Ford wearing a button reading "Pardon Me" and embracing President Richard Nixon 
did not constitute express advocacy). In CLATRIM, the Second Circuit based its holding 
on the fact that the communication before it made "no reference anywhere . . to the 
congressman's party, to whether he is running for re-election, to the existence of an 
election or the act of voting in any election; nor is there anything approaching an unam-
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ines the holding of the one federal court to hear a case involving the 
constitutionality of the new regulations. 
1. The Magic Words Approach 
The First Circuit follows a literal, or magic words, approach to 
Buckley's express advocacy standard, under which a court looks only to 
the communication itself for express terms that advocate for or against 
a clearly identified candidate.85 Absent such phrases as " vote for," 
"elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for Congress," 
"vote against," "defeat," and "reject," the court will not find the com­
munication to be express advocacy regardless of the context of the 
communication. 86 
In Faucher v. FEC, the First Circuit determined that a voter guide 
produced and distributed by a nonprofit corporation did not constitute 
express advocacy. The guide in question was entitled "November Elec­
tion Issue 1988!," with the subheading "Federal & State Candidate 
Surveys Enclosed - Take-along Issue for Election Day!" The guide in­
cluded candidate and party positions on pro-life issues and indicated 
that a "yes" response meant the candidate or party agreed with the Na­
tional Right to Life's position on the issue. The guide also contained a 
disclaimer, noting that the publication did not represent an endorsement 
of any candidate by the organization. 87 The court held that the voter 
guide was not express advocacy for or against a specifically identified 
candidate, reasoning that Buckley had adopted a bright-line test to deter­
mine whether a communication constituted discussion of issues or dis­
cussion of candidates.88 The court did not discuss MCFL's language re-
biguous statement in favor of or against the election of [the c]ongressman." CLATRIM, 
616 F.2d at 53. · 
Thi Tenth Circuit may have looked favorably on the "bright-line" approach in 
Colorado Republican when it declined to reverse a district court finding of no "express 
advocacy" in the advertisements paid for by the Colorado Republican Party targeting 
then U.S. Senator Tim Wirth. Instead, the court held that § 441a(d)(3) applied to all co­
ordinated spending involving a clearly identified candidate "without regard to whether 
that message constitutes express advocacy." See Colorado Republican, 59 F.3d at 1022. 
The district court had stated that it was adopting the "bright-line test," relying on 
Faucher, but it also cited Furgatch several times for support of its express advocacy 
standard without mentioning any distinction between the two approaches. See FEC v. 
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1455-56 (D. Colo. 
1993). 
85. See, e.g., Faucher, 928 F.2d at 410-72. 
86. 928 F.2d at 470 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52 (1976) (per 
curiam)). 
87. See 928 F.2d at 469. 
88. See 928 F.2d at 471. 
702 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:686 
garding a "less direct" 8 9  message· of advocacy or the "essential nature" 
of the communication. 9 0  The court cited MCFL solely for the proposi­
tion that the Supreme Court requires the express advocacy standard to 
be met.91 The words "vote for" were present in the communication in 
question in MCFL, even if they did not precede a candidate's name or 
picture, and the First Circuit apparently presumed that this meant the 
magi� words test had been met. 
The Faucher court based its reliance on the magic words test on 
the difficulty of interpreting the meaning and effects of words. 92  The 
court reasoned that relying on how others interpret a communication to 
determine the communication's meaning would put a speaker "wholly 
at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and conse­
quently of whatever inferences may be drawn to his intent and mean­
ing. " 93 In political speech, insinuation has become an art form. Some­
one could always interpret a political message as advocating the defeat 
or election of a particular candidate. Hence, the court contended, any 
standard beyond explicit language must be unconstitutionally vague. 
2. The New FEC Context-Sensitive Approach To Express Advocacy 
The new FEC regulations adopt a more context-sensitive approach 
to determining whether a communication contains express advocacy, es­
sentially codifying the holding of the Ninth Circuit in FEC v. Furgatch. 
Under the new regulations, a communication that is directed at a clearly 
identified candidate 94 can constitute express advocacy in either of two 
ways. First, the communication is express advocacy if it contains a par-
89. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986). 
90. See 479 U.S. at 249. 
91. See Faucher, 928 F.2d at 470 (citing MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249). 
92. See 928 F.2d at 471. 
93. 928 F.2d at 471 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (per curiam) 
(quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945))). 
94. In order for a communication to qualify as express advocacy it must pass the 
initial hurdle of being directed at a clearly identified candidate. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.16 
(1996). If the communication is not directed at a clearly identified candidate, it will not 
be express advocacy regardless of the context of the communication or whether it con­
tains any of the magic words. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.16 (1996). Candidates are considered 
to be "clearly identified" when the communication clearly identifies the candidate by 
name, nickname, photograph or drawing. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.17 (1996). A candidate 
may also be clearly identified by an unambiguous reference to his or her status, such as 
"the President," "the incumbent," or "the Democratic presidential nominee." 11 
C.F.R. § 100.17 (1996). 
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ticular phrase from a list of phrases based on the magic words in 
Buckley.95 Second, the communication constitutes express advocacy if, 
[w]hen taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events, 
such as the proximity to the election, [it] could only be interpreted by a 
reasonable person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one 
or more clearly identified candidate(s) because - (1) [t]he electoral por­
tion of the communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive 
of only one meaning; and (2) [r]easonable minds could not differ as to 
whether it encourages actions to elect or defeat one or more clearly iden­
tified candidate(s) or encourages some other kind of action.96 
The distinction between the new regulations and the approach of the 
First Circuit in Faucher97 is that the FEC does not halt the search for 
express advocacy after looking for the magic words. Under the new 
regulations, the FEC, or the court, also examines the communication as 
a whole and considers such factors as when and where the communica­
tion takes place.9s 
95. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(a) (1996). The list of phrases includes "phrases such 
as 'vote for the President,' 're-elect your Congressman,' 'support the Democratic nomi­
nee,' . . .  'Smith for Congress,' . . .  'defeat' accompanied by a picture of one or more 
candidate{s), 'reject the incumbent.' " 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(a) (1996). A phrase such as 
" 'vote Pro-Life' or 'vote Pro-Choice' accompanied by a listing of clearly identified 
candidates described as Pro-Life or Pro-Choice" also constitutes express advocacy. 11 
C.F.R. § 100.22(a) (1996). 
96. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1996). 
Additionally, under the new approach communications that contain both issue ad­
vocacy and express electoral advocacy are treated as "express advocacy." 60 Fed. Reg. 
35,292, 35,295 (1995). This approach is consistent with Buckley, which protected only 
strict issue advocacy. See supra notes 12, 33 and accompanying text (discussing the dis­
tinction between communications that contain strict issue advocacy and communications 
which also advocate the election or defeat of a particular candidate). It is also clearly 
warranted. Otherwise, the FECA's requirements could easily be avoided by simply ad­
ding some minimal issue-based call to action into every independent expenditure com­
munication while still clearly advocating for or against a candidate - having the same 
impact on elections and presenting the same problems that the FECA was designed to 
solve. 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93. 
98. For example, a court might be more inclined to find express advocacy if a par­
ticular communication is made three days before the election, than if it were made three 
years before an election. 
The FEC considered imposing a strict time period for communications that dis­
cussed a candidate's character, qualifications or accomplishments, but did not include 
one of the magic phrases. See 60 Fed. Reg. 35,292, 35,295 (1995). If such a communi­
cation was made within a set number of days before an election, and "did not en­
courage any type of action on any specific issue," then the communication would be 
treated as express advocacy. Id. at 35,295. The FEC rejected this approach in part on 
the grounds that it "should be further limited to avoid" impinging on the First Amend­
ment considerations involved. Id. at 35,294. Under the new FEC regulations there is no 
set time period in which certain communications are treated as express advocacy. 
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In Furgatch the Ninth Circuit rejected a strictly construed bright­
line standard for express advocacy.99 The court applied a more context­
sensitive interpretation of Buckley's express advocacy standard 100 that 
asked whether the communication, "when read as a whole, and with 
limited reference to external events, [is] susceptible of no other reasona­
ble interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific 
candidate." 1 0 1  
In Furgatch, the FEC brought suit against Harvey Furgatch for 
failure to report his independent expenditures and for not including a 
disclaimer in his advertisements during the 1980 Presidential election. 1 02 
Furgatch had run an advertisement in the New York 'limes and the Bos­
ton Globe entitled "Don't Let Him Do It" which discussed President 
Jimmy Carter and gave examples of how the sponsor thought Carter 
was "degrading the electoral process and lessening the prestige of the 
office" of the President.1 03 The advertisement in the New York 'limes 
ran one week before the general election; the Boston Globe ad ran three 
days before the election. 1 0 4 
The Ninth Circuit found Furgatch's advertisements to be a form of 
express advocacy against an identified candidate, 1 0 5 reasoning that "ex­
press advocacy" was not strictly limited to a bright-line test of whether 
a communication used certain key phrases.106 It argued that to require 
that the communication use some "magic words" or a perfect synonym 
One commentator, Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, rejects the contextual approach. 
See Hayward, supra note 44, at 86-88. Hayward proposes, instead, that if a communica­
tion is made within a five-day window prior to the election and mentions a specific can­
didate it automatically would be considered express advocacy. See id. at 86-94. She 
adopts the five-day period to mitigate the impact of last-minute negative independent 
expenditures to which the targeted side has no opportunity (or limited opportunity) to 
respond. See id. at 92-93. However, it is hard to justify a strict window approach while 
rejecting all contextual considerations. If we can look to the time of the communication 
at all, what is essential about the five-day limit? People can just as effectively run nega­
tive advertisements that can destroy a campaign six or ten days or even two weeks prior 
to an election. 
99. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1987). 
100. See 807 F.2d at 863. 
101. 807 F.2d at 864. It should be noted that Furgatch was argued and the opinion 
was submitted, but not filed, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in FEC v. MCFL, 
479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
102. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 859. 
103. 807 F.2d at 858 (quoting Don't Let Him Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1980, at 
A29 (advertisement)). 
104. See 807 F.2d at 858 (referring to the advertisement that ran in the Boston 
Globe on Nov. 1, 1980). 
105. See 807 F.2d at 864-65. 
106. See 807 F.2d at 862-63. 
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of the words highlighted as examples in Buckley would destroy the ef­
fectiveness of the FECA.107 
The Ninth Circuit instead established a standard that looks to the 
context of the communication to determine whether it meets Buckley's 
express advocacy standard.108 The court held that despite the First Cir­
cuit's rejection of anything but a bright-line test,109 there was nothing in 
Buckley to suggest that the magic words test is the only way to survive 
the vagueness doctrine. The court reasoned that the Buckley express ad­
vocacy standard was intended to eliminate vague statutory language as 
well as to balance the important Congressional policy objectives and the 
First Amendment interests involved.110 
Because traditional First Amendment doctrine recognizes "that 
words take part of their meaning and effect from the environment in 
which they are spoken," the Furgatch court concluded that context 
should be a relevant, but ancillary, consideration under the express ad­
vocacy standard for determining the meaning of the communication.111 
In other words, the Court recognized that words derive part of their 
meaning from the context in which they are communicated. A political 
advertisement may clearly advocate the election or defeat of a particular 
candidate despite the fact that it does not contain one of the magic 
words. Its meaning can be unambiguously derived from the context of 
the communication. 
3. The New Regulations and the Courts 
The issue of the constitutionality of the new FEC regulations is 
certain to divide the circuits. Because the regulations codify the Ninth 
Circuit's approach, they will certainly be constitutional there. However, 
as the only other court to hear the issue thus far demonstrates, courts 
following the magic words approach will find no room in the Constitu­
tion for the FEC's most recent interpretation of the express advocacy 
standard. 
Recently, in Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. FEC,112 the 
same federal district court that initially adopted the magic words ap-
107. See 807 F.2d at 863. 
108. See 807 F.2d at 863-64. 
109. See Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 471-72 (1st Cir. 1991). 
110. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862. 
111. 807 F.2d at 863-64. 
112. 914 F. Supp. 8 (D. Me. 1996) [hereinafter MRLC]. MRLC is a nonprofit 
membership corporation that advocates against abortion rights. The corporation sought a 
declaratory judgment that the FEC's new definition of express advocacy, designed to 
carry out the FECA's prohibition of corporate financial support for independent expend-
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proach, 1 13 later upheld .by the First Circuit in Faucher v. FEC, 114 held 
the new FEC regulations unconstitutional. The court held that, because 
the regulations reached communications that did not include the magic 
words, the regulation was invalid as not authorized by the FECA, as in­
terpreted by the Supreme Court and the First Circuit.115 
Curiously, the court admitted that a communication derives part of 
its meaning from the context in which it is delivered. In fact, the court 
went as far as admitting that even Buckley called for some "[l]imited 
reference to external events" because "[a]fter all, how does one know 
that 'support' or 'defeat' means an election rather than an athletic con­
test or some other event without considering the external context of a 
federal election with specific candidates?" 116 
The court also gave some indication that the regulations could sur­
vive a constitutional challenge based on vagueness. In its early analysis 
of the regulations, the court noted that the regulations "appear[] to be a 
very reasonable attempt to deal with these vagaries of language and, in­
deed, [are] drawn quite narrowly to deal with only the 'unmistakable' 
and 'unambiguous,' cases where 'reasonable minds cannot differ' on 
the message."1 17 The court, however, naturally followed the First Cir­
cuit "bright-line" approach, maintaining that Buckley drew "a bright 
line that may err on the side of permitting things that affect the election 
process, but at all costs avoids restricting, in any way, discussion of 
public issues." 1 18 
Il. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION 
COMMISSION'S STANDARD 
This Part argues that the new FEC regulations comply with the re­
quirements of Buckley and provide the best means of enforcing FECA. 
Section IT.A argues that the new regulations are consistent with the Su­
preme Court's holding in Buckley and its clarification in MCFL. Section 
itures, was unconstitutionally vague and the government should be enjoined from en­
forcing it. 
113. See Faucher v. FEC, 743 F. Supp. 64 (D. Me. 1990), affd., 928 F.2d 468 (1st 
Cir. 1991). 
1 14. 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1991). 
115. See MRLC, 914 F. Supp. at 13. 
116. 914 F. Supp. at 11 (quoting in part 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1996)). 
117. 914 F. Supp. at 1 1  (quoting 1 1  C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1996)). 
118. 914 F. Supp. at 12. The court recognized that "[t]he result is not very satisfy­
ing from a realistic communications point of view and does not give much recognition 
to the policy of the election statute to keep corporate money from influencing elections 
in this way, but it does recogiiize the First Amendment interest as the Court has defined 
it." 914 F. Supp. at 12. 
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11.B argues that the new approach enables the government to meet its 
compelling interests behind the FECA's disclosure and reporting re­
quirements for independent expenditures, and is narrowly tailored to 
such ends. Finally, section II.C argues that the context-sensitive ap­
proach is consistent with the Court's treatment of other areas of First 
Amendment law. 
A. Why the New FEC Approach Complies with the Language of 
Buckley and Its Progeny 
This section argues that the new FEC regulations comply with the 
Supreme Court's holdings in Buckley and its progeny. Section II.A.1 
puts forth the argument that the new regulations comply with the exact 
language used in Buckley and the later Supreme Court cases on this 
subject, as well as traditional views on interpreting the meaning of a 
communication. Section II.A.2 argues that the FEC regulations are a 
constitutional and appropriate response to Buckley's main concern re­
garding the independent expenditure provisions - that the original lan­
guage of the Act was too vague and may be overbroad. 
1 .  Compliance with the Buckley Language and its Directive 
The new FEC regulations comply with the Court's actual language 
in Buckley. In order to avoid vagueness concerns, 119 the Buckley Court 
limited the reach of the Act to independent expenditures that constitute 
express advocacy and added, in a footnote, that express advocacy in­
cludes words "such as" - implying that it is not limited to - the 
magic words. As the court in Furgatch noted, however, Buckley did not 
claim that use of these words was the only way a communication can 
constitute express advocacy; this "short list of words . . .  does not ex­
haust the capacity of the English language to expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a candidate." 120 
Additionally, the context in which the communication is made is 
important for the simple reason that words derive part of their meaning 
from the context in which they are used: 121 "Words are not pebbles in 
119. See supra section I.A (discussing the vagueness doctrine). 
120. FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987). 
121. See 807 F.2d at 863-64; MLRC, 914 F. Supp. at 11. As Professor Sunstein has 
explained: 
Some people think that the contextual character of meaning undermines the pro­
ject of rule-following. But this is a mistake. "Bat" may mean one thing in con­
nection with baseball and another thing in connection with a zoo, but the term, 
taken in its context, may well be determinate, and its meaning need not depend 
on a moral or political argument of any sort. The contextual character of meaning 
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alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only 
does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggre­
gate take their purport from the setting in which they are used."122 
Therefore, determining whether a communication constitutes express 
advocacy actually requires looking, to some extent, at the context of the 
communication. 
2. Avoiding the Trappings of the Vagueness Doctrine 
The FEC's context-based approach, with its emphasis on clearly 
unambiguous advocacy, protects the FECA from violating the vague­
ness doctrine. The Buckley Court adopted an express advocacy standard 
so that FECA could avoid the reach of the vagueness doctrine and over­
breadth problems.123 But this does not mean that the magic words in­
cluded in Buckley, "or their nearly perfect synonyms" 124 exhaust the 
possibilities for finding either express advocacy or a constitutionally ac­
ceptable requirement for disclosure and reporting of independent ex­
penditures.125 The only relevant criterion in applying the express advo­
cacy standard is that the independent expenditure must "unambiguously 
relateO to the campaign of a particular federal candidate." 126 
Due process requires that criminal statutes, like the new regula­
tions, 127 "provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence 
warns us not to make "a fortress out of the dictionary," [Cabell v. Markham, 148 
F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)], and thus to avoid mechanical reliance on diction­
ary definitions when the context suggests that the dictionary meaning is not apt. 
CASS R SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND PoLmCAL CONFLICT 123 (1996). 
122. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.), 
quoted in Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Rev., 488 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1988). 
123. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. l, 43, 80 (1976) (per curiam). In narrowly 
defining express advocacy, the Court also required that a candidate be "clearly identi­
fied," that is, that "an explicit and unambiguous reference to the candidate appear as 
part of the communication." 424 U.S. at 43. 
124. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863. 
125. See 807 F.2d at 863; State ex rel. WMC Issues Mobilization Council, Inc. v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, No. 96-3133-W, at 9-10 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1996) 
(opinion supplementing order of Nov. l, 1996) (holding that Buckley did not establish a 
bright-line rule, "particularly in view of its progeny, including Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)"). But see Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 
472 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that Buckley adopted a bright-line test). 
126. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80; see also 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (quoting Grayned v. 
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 
360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)))) (discussing 
vagueness standard); TRIBE, supra note 40, § 12-31, at 1033-35 (summarizing void-for­
vagueness standard); supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
127. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the criminal sanctions 
and fines the FEC may impose for PECA violations). 
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that his contemplated conduct is illegal." 128 When First A mendment 
rights are involved the bar is raised even higher, requiring an even 
"greater degree of specificity."129 The Buckley Court feared that a 
vague standard would chill speech of individuals intending to steer clear 
of violations because a vague definition of express advocacy would 
place a speaker "wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his 
hearers."130 The new regulations require that the communication "could 
only be interpreted by a reasonable person" as advocating the election 
or defeat of a specific candidate.131 This standard insists that the com­
munication is clear, specific and fully perceptible to any reasonable 
person. 
Some may argue that the FEC standard is itself vague, and thus the 
threat of litigation will deter individuals from making communications, 
even when the communication is ultimately found not to be in violation 
of the A ct's requirements.132 After all, how are courts - or, more im­
portantly, persons who wish to engage in strict issue advocacy but want 
to avoid making independent expenditures that would bring them within 
the reporting and disclosure requirements of the PECA - to determine 
when no reasonable person could differ as to whether the communica­
tion in question is advocating the election or defyat of a specific candi­
date? There are two answers to this question. First, if the communica­
tion is unambiguously electoral advocacy under the FEC regulations, a 
person who doubts the communication is intended as electoral advocacy 
must by definition be unreasonable. Second, and more important, the 
Supreme Court has upheld other similar standards as not impermissibly 
vague. For example, in obscenity cases the Court finds obscenity by 
asking "whether to the average person, applying contemporary commu­
nity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole ap­
peals to prurient interest." 133 A ny standard that requires that no reasona­
ble minds could differ as to whether a communication is electoral 
advocacy is at least as unambiguous as a standard that asks simply what 
128. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77 (citing United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 
(1954)). 
129. 424 U.S. at 77 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)). 
130. 424 U.S. at 43 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)). 
131. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1996). 
132. See Maine Right to Life Committee v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 13 (D. Me. 
1996) (arguing, in dicta, that because "what is issue advocacy a year before the election 
may become express advocacy on the eve of the election and the speaker must continu­
ally re-evaluate his or her words as the election approaches," the FEC's regulations 
chill free speech in violation of the First Amendment); see also Faucher v. FEC, 928 
F.2d 468, 471-7� (1st Cir. 1991) (expressing vagueness concerns regarding any ap-
proach beyond a bright-line rule). 
· 
133. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). 
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an average person would find when applying community standards.134 
fu short, the new regulations are "drawn quite narrowly to deal with 
only the 'unmistakable' and 'unambiguous' cases; " 135 they are therefore 
essentially not vague by definition.136 By requiring that no reasonable 
minds could differ, any party of reasonable intelligence should know 
when they will be required to report and disclose the expenditure or, if 
they are a for-profit corporation, when they are restricted from making 
independent expenditures from their general treasury funds.137 
Finally, the new regulations are not unconstitutionally overbroad.138 
fu other words, the regulations do not "in attaining a permissible end, 
unduly . . .  infringe the protected freedom" of issue advocacy.139 A 
regulation is overbroad if it reaches beyond speech that may be consti­
tutionally regulated to cover speech or conduct which is protected by 
the guarantees of free speech or free association.140 The Court in 
Buckley upheld reporting and disclosure limitations on expenditures that 
"unambiguously relateO "  to advocacy for or against a particular candi­
date.141 By requiring that reasonable minds could not differ over the fact 
that the communication advocates for or against a candidate, the new 
standard does not bring within its sweep constitutionally protected strict 
issue advocacy.142 
134. Some might argue that the obscenity standard is narrowed by relying on con­
temporary community standards, see 354 U.S. at 489, and that this distinguishes the ob­
scenity standard from the new FEC regulations. However, this argument neglects the 
fact that the FEC regulations encompass a community standard as well, so long as the 
community is made up of reasonable people. Thus, the FEC regulation arguably gives 
even greater protection to those wishing to engage in free speech than the obscenity 
standard. After all, the obscenity standard requires courts to apply the local community 
standards, which may have a much more encompassing view of what constitutes ob­
scenity than do communities elsewhere in the country. The FEC regulations mean, in ef­
fect, that the potential speaker can rely on any reasonable person in the country to find 
that the speech was not advocating for or against an identified candidate. 
135. MLRC, 914 F. Supp. at 11. 
136. This argument follows the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in FEC v. Furgatch, 
807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987). See also MLRC, 914 F. Supp. at 11-12 (suggesting, 
without reaching the issue, that the new regulations may provide an unambiguous stan­
dard); supra text accompanying notes 116-18. 
137. See supra note 7 (discussing the requirements for disclosure and reporting); 
supra note 74 (discussing the prohibition on corporate expenditures from nonsegregated 
accounts). 
138. For a discussion of overbreadth, see supra note 51. 
139. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). 
140. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940). 
141. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam); see also supra 
note 59 and accompanying text 
142. On the Buckley Court's concerns regarding the threat to First Amendment 
rights from vague statutory or regulatory language, see supra notes 52-54 and accompa­
nying text 
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B.  The Ability To Meet the Compelling Governmental Interests 
When courts apply strict scrutiny review to a statute or regulation 
that regulates a fundamental right, such as the freedom of speech or as­
sociation, courts will uphold the statute or regulation only if there is a 
compelling governmental interest for the measure, and the measure is 
narrowly tailored to meet that interest.143 The FEC's standard satisfies 
each of these requirements. 
1. Meeting the Compelling Governmental· Interests 
In Buckley, the Court recognized three compelling governmental 
interests behind the FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements: pro­
viding information to the public to evaluate candidates, deterring actual 
and apparent corruption, and gathering data for enforcement of cam­
paign laws.144 In later cases, the Court recognized that the government 
also has a compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption 
and the appearance of corruption arising from for-profit corporate inde­
pendent expenditures.145 These goals attempt to ensure an effective and 
fair electoral system in our republic.146 In order to meet these goals, the 
government must have a system that results in the disclosure and re­
porting required by the Act, as well as the perception in the general 
public's eye that these laws will be enforced. None of these goals is met 
by the magic words approach because it can be so easily evaded. 
The new FEC regulations give the government the ability to fur­
ther its compelling interests embodied in the independent expenditure 
requirements. Requiring disclosure keeps "the electorate fully informed 
of the sources of campaign-directed speech and the possible connec­
tions between the speaker and individual candidates."147 Information in 
the form of an anonymous communication clearly sends a different 
message from a communication that discloses the identity of the mes-
143. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of 
strict scrutiny). 
144. See Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68). 
145. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 256-60 (1986); 
FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982). 
146. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the im­
portance of a fully informed electorate and reducing corruption). 
147. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862. The reporting and disclosure requirements also 
serve a broader goal of preserving legitimate campaigns by enabling voters to make in­
formed choices between candidates. See 807 F.2d at 862; Gardner, supra note 13, at 
249-55 (criticizing Buckley's constitutional rulings on the FECA and urging a broader 
governmental interest in preserving electoral legitimacy). 
· 
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senger.148 The Supreme Court has emphasized that this information al­
lows the electorate to evaluate properly a candidate's ideology, inter­
ests, and likely future performance - information crucial to selecting a 
representative.149 
Disclosure arid reporting also deter the exchange of campaign sup­
port for political favors by subjecting this support to greater scrutiny.150 
Those wishing to curry favor will be deterred by the fact that "all ex­
penditures will be scrutinized by the [FEC] and by the public for just 
this sort of abuse." 151 Additionally, the FECA's disclosure and reporting 
requirements further the First Amendment goal of ensuring that the 
electorate has alf the necessary information to properly evaluate the 
communication.152 Greater disclosure and reporting also means that the 
government is better equipped to detect and deter corruption.153 
Finally, the vast increase of such expenditures since the Buckley 
ruling intensifies the need for a context-based approach.154 One reason 
148. It is true that many organizations that finance independent expenditures select 
names that may be misleading. For example, a communication by the Auto Dealers and 
Drivers for Fair Trade was paid for by a foreign car dealership group. See Pianin, supra 
note 5, at A19. However, the media and opposing candidates can use the reporting and 
disclosure requirements to obtain the true identity of the organization and relay that to 
the general public. 
149. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (per curiam); see also 
Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862. 
150. See First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978). 
151. Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 1 15 S. Ct 1511,  1523 (1995). 
152. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862. 
153. See 807 F.2d at 862 (holding that a more comprehensive approach is needed 
to ensure that the compelling interests are met). 
Disclosure also allows the public a better opportunity to detect any "post-election 
special favors that may be given in return" for financial support during the campaign. 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. 
The Supreme Court recently recognized that the definition of corruption can extend 
beyond the mere quid pro quo of special political favors for cash. In Austin v. Michigan 
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the Court upheld a Michigan statute 
prohibiting corporations from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures 
in state candidate elections, despite the infringement on the corporations' political 
speech, because an unfair advantage may result from corporate-financed independent 
expenditures. The Court reached this result because "[t]he resources in the treasury of a 
business corporation . . .  are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's 
· political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors 
and customers." 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens For Life v. FEC, 479 
U.S. 238, 257 (1986)). Therefore, the Court held that a legislature may attempt to con­
trol the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are ac­
cumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to 
the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." 494 U.S. at 660. 
154. The Furgatch court properly took note of this in 1987. See Furgatch, 807 
F.2d at 862 (noting that independent expenditures have "become more widespread in 
federal elections, and the need for controls more urgent"). 
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that the Buckley Court differentiated between independent expenditures 
and contributions was that independent expenditures, at the time of 
Buckley, did "not . . .  appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corrup­
tion comparable to those identified with large campaign contribu­
tions." 155 The fact that independent expenditures play an immensely 
more significant role in elections today156 places this issue in a different 
light and makes the FEC's interest all the more compelling.157 
2. Narrow Tailoring 
If courts applying strict scrutiny review find a compelling govern­
mental interest for a given regulation, they next determine whether the 
statute or regulation in question is narrowly drawn to meet that inter­
est.158 There is no doubt that the "magic word" approach of the First 
Circuit is more narrowly tailored than the context-sensitive approach 
adopted by the FEC and the Ninth Circuit. However, that does not 
mean that the context-sensitive approach fails the narrow fit test. What 
the Court means by "narrowly tailored" is not that the government 
must choose the least-restrictive means of achieving its objective. It 
only means that the government's method must not be "substantially 
broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest." 159 
With the regulation of independent expenditures, courts attempt to 
ensure that they do "not place burdens on the freedom of speech be­
yond what is strictly necessary to further the purposes of the Act." 160 At 
Another argument for the context-sensitive approach is that by taking into account 
the timing of a communication, the new FEC approach also provides at least a small 
amount of protection against last-minute independent expenditures. Frequently, last­
minute independent expenditures fund the most negative type of campaign advertise­
ments, which are often only tenuously supported by the record, and can have a signifi­
cant impact on the election's outcome. See Robert Brett Dunham, Note and Comment, 
Defoliating the Grassroots: Election Day Restrictions on Political Speech, 77 GEO. L.J. 
2137, 2158 n.120 (1989); Ronald J. Ostrow, Walsh's Use of Weinberger Notes Assailed, 
L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1992, at 4. By taking into account the timing of the communica­
tion, the public can "learn the source behind these expenditures and will . . .  receive 
full information about a candidate's supporters and opponents." Hayward, supra note 
44, at 60; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (per curiam). 
155. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46. 
156. See supra note 23. 
157. See State ex rel. WMC Issues Mobilization Council, Inc. v. Circuit Court for 
Dane County, No. 96-3133-W, at 10 (Wis. Ct App. Nov. 8, 1996). But see Colorado 
Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 1 16 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1996) (plurality opinion) 
(suggesting that Buckley's conclusion that independent expenditures did not pose the 
same risk of a "quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate" is still 
controlling) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47). 
158. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
159. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989). 
160. FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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the same time, courts attempt to ensure that the purposes of the Act 
"are fully carried out, that they are not cleverly circumvented, or 
thwarted by a rigid construction of the terms of the Act." 161 • 
The new FEC approach, in contrast to the bright-line rule, provides 
more complete coverage of independent expenditures and allows for 
more effective enforcement of the FECA. The magic words interpreta­
tion of Buckley's express advocacy standard runs the risk of thwarting 
the impact of the FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements.162 FEC 
officials have recognized that a magic words test allows organizations 
or individuals supporting a candidate to · easily avoid the reach of the 
Act by simply avoiding key words, while communicating the same 
message which is unmistakably directed at electoral advocacy.163 
A good example of the broader application of the new regulations 
can be seen by analyzing its application to the hypothetical NRA 
Clinton advertisement example used in the introduction - the one that 
urged people not to let "Bill Clinton do it to us again." 164 Under the lit­
eral approach, the communication does not include any of the magic 
words of Buckley. Thus, the NRA would not have to report the expendi­
ture or make a disclosure on the communication. Under the context­
sensitive approach, the fact that the advertisement was only a few days 
away from a major presidential election, included a great deal of discus­
sion about the campaign, and encouraged people in three days not to 
"let Bill Clinton do it to us again" gives context to the communica-
161. 807 F.2d at 862. 
162. See 807 F.2d at 862. 
163. See Camey, supra note 23, at 1315 (quoting FEC General Counsel Lawrence 
M. Noble); see also Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863. The same could be said for proposals 
which apply a bright-line rule on time. See Hayward, supra note 44, at 88-95 (sug­
gesting a bright-line rule on time near the end of the campaign); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 
33,547, 33,560 (1992) (proposed July 29, 1992) (presenting Alternative A-2 - a defini­
tion of express advocacy that the FEC considered and rejected - which advocates a 
time-buffer provjsion allowing the FEC to treat all messages mentioning a candidate as 
express advocacy if the communication appears within a certain number of days prior to 
the election). Clever campaigners simply could run advertisements just before the dead­
line, circumventing the rule but still having a significant impact on the election. The 
real problem, however, is that there is no reason to suspect that the time just before the 
election is any more critical to a campaign. A communication made early on in the pri­
mary, without disclosure or reporting, may hinder (or help) a candidate to such an ex­
tent that her fate is fixed. A prime example is a vicious attack early in a primary from 
an undisclosed source. Such an early attack may mean that a candidate is unable to 
raise money or gain endorsements from key people. The campaign may never fully re­
cover. Although this may do damage to a candidate regardless of whether there is dis­
closure and reporting by the party responsible for the independent expenditure, if there 
is disclosure and reporting, financial supporters, endorsers, and the media may make a 
more informed decision regarding how much weight to give the communication. 
164. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text 
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tion's express message: "Vote against Bill Clinton so he cannot take our 
weapons away." Under the new FEC regulations, the NRA would be 
required to place a disclosure on the advertisement and report the 
amount of the expenditure to the FEC. 
Adopting a more flexible rule - one that gets at more of the com­
munications having the effect, or perception, of influencing elections -
better avoids corruption, and the perception of corruption, in our politi­
cal process. Having access to information about who a candidate's sup­
porters and detractors are allows the public to make a more informed 
decision about the candidates and their positions. Those who are avid 
NRA supporters might be more inclined to vote against Bill Clinton. On 
the other hand, voters who support gun owner's rights, but are suspect 
of the NRA, might be more cautious in accepting the advertisement's 
claims. Perhaps these people support the right to own guns in general, 
but agree with Clinton's views regarding restrictions on the right to own 
automatic assault weapons. Requiring the disclosure on the advertise­
ment may make a great deal of difference in the minds of these 
voters.165 
Finally, as the Court noted in Buckley, the fact that the regulations 
only require reporting and disclosure for individuals and groups, rather 
than an outright ban on such expenditures, 166 . means that the regulations 
create only a " 'reasonable and minimally restrictive' effect on the ex­
ercise of First Amendment rights" while protecting issue advocacy.167 
C. Consistency With Other Areas of First Amendment Law 
The context-sensitive approach is consistent with the Court's treat­
ment of various other areas of First Amendment law. For a court to re­
quire a bright-line test, and to hold that a court can never look to the 
context of the communication to determine if the speech can be regu­
lated, would require invalidating a litany of similarly based First 
Amendment restrictions previously upheld by the Court.168 For example, 
" [t]he doctrines of subversive speech, 'fighting words,' libel, and 
speech in the workplace and in public fora illustrate that when and 
where speech takes place can determine its legal significance. In these 
165. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 862. 
166. But see supra note 74 (discussing the fact that corporations are prohibited 
from making such expenditures from nonsegregated funds based on a lower degree of 
First Amendment protection of corporate political speech). 
167. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 862 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82); see also 60 Fed. 
Reg. 35,292, 35,295 (1995). 
168. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863. 
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instances, context is one of the crucial factors making these kinds of 
speech regulable." 169 
Fighting words are not regulated by a bright-line rule because a 
more flexible approach is needed to ensure that the compelling govern­
mental interests are met; yet, the First Amendment interests involved 
are still protected.170 The Court never simply says that certain words al­
ways will constitute fighting words. Rather, the words derive their 
meaning, as fighting words, from the context in which they are used. 
Professor Stephen Gard has pointed out that for the words to be consid­
ered "fighting words" they must "hav.e a direct tendency to cause an 
immediate violent response by the average recipient," 171 be "uttered 
face-to-face to the addressee,"172 and be "directed to an individual." 173 
Thus, the court must look to the context of the words to determine if 
the government can punish the speaker for the use of "fighting 
words."174 A bright-line rule would not strike a proper balance between 
the government's interest in ensuring public safety and the First 
Amendment interests at stake. 
Another prime example of the Court granting the government the 
ability to regulate otherwise protected speech because of the context in 
which it arose occurred in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,175 which dealt 
with the regulation of indecent language on the public airwaves. In 
Pacifica a local radio station aired, during an early weekday afternoon, 
a monologue by the satirist George Carlin. The monologue was part of 
a larger program by the radio station to discuss attitudes toward lan­
guage and the Carlin piece included his well-known bit about the seven 
169. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 
(1961), Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, also recognized that the Court has consist­
ently found some "speech in certain contexts, [to be] outside the scope of constitutional 
protection." 366 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted). 
170. See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863. 
171. Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 
536 (1980) (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp­
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). 
172. Id. at 536 (citing Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) 
(Powell, J., concurring)). 
173. Id. at 536 (citing Gooding, 405 U.S. at 518; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15; Chaplin­
sky, 3 15 U.S. at 568). 
174. See id. at 536 (arguing that these contextual factors are what courts look to in 
detennining words' status as "fighting words," but arguing for abolishment of the 
"fighting words" doctrine as a relic of past morality). But see Gooding, 405 U.S. at 537 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (clain!ing that "the Court, despite its protestations to the con­
trary, is merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky" and that the Court has gone too far in 
narrowing the application of the "fighting words" doctrine). 
175. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
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dirty words which "you definitely wouldn't say ever" on the public air­
waves. The FCC, while not asserting that it could ban nonobscene but 
"indecent" language from all airwaves at all times, argued that the con­
text was all-important and that it could therefore keep this kind of lan­
guage off the airwaves in the early afternoon, when children were more 
likely to be in the audience.176 The Court upheld the FCC position, not­
ing that while these words are entitled to some First Amendment pro­
tection, their "social value" depends on the context in which they are 
used.177 Thus, the FCC had the right to take the context of the commu­
nication into account, and the regulations were regulable only because 
of the context in which they were used. 
These doctrines demonstrate that the Court believes context­
sensitive approaches are the most effective means of balancing the com­
pelling governmental interests against the free speech rights of individu­
als and groups. Under the same reasoning, a context-sensitive approach 
is necessary for determining when independent e�penditures can be reg­
ulated. Without it, a vast number of communications that the govern­
ment has a compelling interest in regulating will escape the reporting 
and disclosure requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
The Buckley Court's express advocacy standard is a positive step 
in that it protects fundamental First Amendment interests implicated 
when Congress attempts to regulate in an area as sacred as political 
speech. At the same time, it recognizes the reality that regulating elec­
tions helps to ensure the integrity of the American republic by provid­
ing fair elections and working to root out corruption within the political 
system. 
If courts reject the new FEC regulations in favor of the literal ap­
proach of the First Circuit, the role of independent expenditures in our 
election process will no doubt continue to grow at an even more rapid 
pace, unabated by the checks of public disclosure and reporting. It is 
time for the courts to recognize that campaigning has changed. The 
same fears of a decrease in public confidence in the fairness of our 
electoral system, and in corruption from quid pro arrangements that led 
Congress and the Court to accept stricter regulation of direct contribu­
tions, now surround independent expenditures. Because of the impor­
tance of the freedom of speech - and its particular importance in the 
political arena - courts must walk a tightrope when it comes to the 
176. See 438 U.S. at 731-34. 
177. See 438 U.S. at 747-48 (Stevens, J.). 
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regulation of independent expenditures. The courts must now give the 
government the ability to lasso the corruption, actual and perceived, that 
comes with well-financed independent expenditure campaigns by spe­
cial interest groups. 
A context-sensitive approach will certainly not be sufficient to 
clean up the entire political process. But this approach can ensure that 
the public gets more information regarding the funding of campaign ad­
vertisements and which special interest group is spending hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to elect or defeat which candidate. This informa­
tion allows the public, and particularly the media, who can broadcast 
such information to a wide audience, the ability to make better judg­
ments about the content and veracity of particular communications. It 
provides the FEC and citizen "watch dog" organizations the ability to 
discover corruption or expose politicians who provide special favors for 
groups that have made independent expenditures for them. In short, the 
FEC's approach gives the American people important information re­
garding a candidate's supporters or detractors - often critical informa­
tion in helping people determine who they want their representatives to 
be - without overly restricting First Amendment rights. 
